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In this article, it is inquired which reasons are decisive for acting 
in accordance with divine commands, and whether these can be 
regarded as moral reasons; the emphasis lies on Christianity. To this 
effect, the position of God as a—basic—lawgiver is expounded, 
with special attention to the role His power plays. By means of 
an account of the grounds given (in the Bible) to obey God, the 
selfish motives in this respect are brought to light. It is questioned 
whether any other elements can be discerned, particularly from a 
meta-ethical perspective.
Introduction
An appeal to “good” and “bad” actions in religions is evident. Steal-
ing, e.g., is considered to be wrong, whereas giving to the poor is 
prescribed as good. In this article, I will examine to what extent it 
may be maintained that such moral elements are indeed inherent in 
divine commands or exhortations; I will focus on the Christian faith. 
In section 1, two positions are outlined. Those who indicate some 
things to be good or bad as such, irrespective of God’s ruling, and 
the thinkers who emphasize God’s radical power and who state that 
God decides these matters, thus arguing a radical omnipotence, are 
juxtaposed, although their positions may not differ greatly from an 
ethical (or meta-ethical) viewpoint.
Section 2 is focused on the consequences of these alternative out-
looks. If there are such things as good and bad actions, it is important 
to find out why these are respectively prescribed and abhorred (sub-
section 2.1). A number of Biblical passages can illustrate the reasons 
to behave in a certain way. Subsection 2.2 briefly explores the second 
perspective stated in section 1.
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Section 3 presents an alternative; the goal is to be as critical as 
possible in analyzing the reasons to adhere to the commands one is to 
obey. In particular, it is inquired which role selfishness plays; is an act 
of altruism possible? I have not limited the research to religion here, 
but have tried to find a broader scope. In section 4, some relevant 
remaining meta-ethical questions are dealt with. Some Christian 
philosophers have, e.g., appealed to intuitions in order to account for 
the existence of goodness.
In this article, I attempt to approach matters with an open view, 
not dismissing any position a priori. This should lead to a consistent 
whole and to credible results.
1. The Nature of “Goodness” from a Religious Perspective
The main question addressed in this article, whether moral acts can 
be performed within a religious scope, raises the subsequent one on 
what basis goodness can be acknowledged to exist. Whether this can 
exist at all is a more fundamental question, which will be dealt with 
later, although it is connected with the issue of the source of goodness, 
which is the subject-matter of this section.
In Christian philosophy, two positions can rudimentarily be dis-
tinguished. On the one hand, it is stated that goodness exists as such, 
God’s commands reflecting this. On the other hand, it is deemed to be 
at God’s disposal to determine which acts are good and which aren’t, 
rendering goodness contingent in this respect. (The issue already, in 
nuce, receives attention from Plato; in an early work, the question is 
put forward whether something is approved of by the gods because it 
is pious, or, conversely, pious because they approve of it [Plato 1959, 
10a].) Of course, middle positions are also possible and have even 
been defended, but as this is of minor relevance to this article, I will 
merely deal with the two options mentioned.
Bonaventura’s line of thought is an example of the first position. 
He limits God’s power by stating:
God is omnipotent, but in such a way that no culpable acts are at-
tributed to Him, such as lying and wanting evil. (Deus est omnipo-
tens, ita tamen, quod ei non attribuuntur actus culpabiles, utpote 
mentiri et malle velle.) (Bonaventura 1891, part 1, chap. 9 [215])1
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God’s will is so right that it can in no way stray. ([Voluntas Dei] 
sic est recta, ut nullo modo potest obliquari.) (Bonaventura 1891, 
part 1, chap. 9 [217])
A (or the) right way to act is presupposed here, independent of God’s 
decisions. Further, 
The divine omnipotence, through everything, is irreprehensible, 
since it only prescribes, prohibits, or suggests justly; it merely acts in a 
good way, and permits nothing unjustly. ([Divina omnipotentia] per 
omnia est irreprehensibilis, quia nihil nisi iuste praecipit, prohibit, vel 
consulit; nihil agit nisi bene, nihil permittit iniuste.) (Bonaventura 
1891, part 1, chap. 9 [217])
This presupposes a (or the) just way to proceed, again independent 
of God’s decisions. In a similar vein, Thomas Aquinas indicates some 
acts to be good or bad by their kind. (“[Q]uidam actus sunt boni ex 
genere. . . . Quidam vero sunt actus mali ex genere.” Aquinas 1892, 
1a2ae, q. 92, art. 2 [161]).
Even Damiani, famous for his emphasis on God’s omnipotence 
(Damiani 1972, 612 A, B [448]), maintains that God can’t perform 
an evil act:
It is clear that God is unable to do something bad, just as He is 
ignorant in this regard. For He is unable to lie, or commit perjury, 
or do something unjust, nor does He know how to. ([V]idelicet 
quicquid malum est, sicut non [Deus] potest agere, ita nescit agere. 
Non enim potest aut scit mentiri, vel peiurare, vel iniustum aliquid 
facere.) (Damiani 1972, 597 C [390, 392] [cf. 600 A (400), 610 
D (442)])
It would not contribute to God’s power to be able to engage in such 
actions, so His being unable to perform them does not conflict with 
His omnipotence. From Damiani’s presentation it appears that his view 
is similar to Bonaventura’s with regard to the existence of goodness 
(and evil). Leibniz presents an additional argument: 
I am far removed from the opinion of those who maintain that there 
are absolutely no rules concerning goodness or perfection in the 
nature of things or in the ideas that God has of them, and that the 
works of God are merely good because of this formal reason that 
God has made them. For if that were the case, God, knowing that 
He is their creator, would only have to observe them afterwards, 
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and deem them good. . . . Furthermore, by saying that things aren’t 
good by any standard of goodness, but by God’s will only, one 
destroys, it seems to me, without thinking, the entire love of God 
and His entire glory. ([J]e suis fort eloigné du sentiment de ceux 
qui soutiennent qu’il n’y a point de regles de bonté et de perfection 
dans la nature des choses ou dans les idées que Dieu en a, et que 
les ouvrages de Dieu ne sont bons que par cette raison formelle 
que Dieu les a faits. Car si cela estoit, Dieu sçachant qu’il en est 
l’auteur, n’avoit que faire de les regarder par après, et de les trouver 
bons. . . . Aussi, disant que les choses ne sont bonnes par aucune 
regle de bonté, mais par la seule volonté de Dieu, on détruit, ce 
me semble, sans y penser, tout l’amour de Dieu, et toute sa gloire.) 
(Leibniz 1999, §2 [1532])
Leibniz, then, emphasizes the content of goodness and on that ground 
wants to cling to an absolute standard by which God abides.
By contrast, one may argue that God’s power is not limited in 
this respect, nor should it be, God Himself determining what it is 
for something to be good at all. Biel states, e.g., that it follows from 
God’s omnipotence that He can command someone to lie without this 
resulting in a sin (Biel 1979, Book 3, Distinctio 38, Quaestio unica 
[Art. 2, Concl. 2], G. [649, 650]). Accordingly, that it is forbidden 
to lie—“Neither shalt thou bear false witness against thy neighbor.” 
(Deuteronomy 5:20)—is a random given. God decides completely 
unhindered what “good” and “bad” mean. This is also Descartes’s view: 
[T]here can be nothing whatsoever which does not depend on God. 
This applies not just to everything that subsists, but to all order, 
every law, and every reason for anything’s being true or good. If 
this were not so, then . . . God would not have been completely 
indifferent with respect to the creation of what he did in fact cre-
ate. If some reason for something’s being good had existed prior to 
his preordination, this would have determined God to prefer those 
things which it was best to do. But on the contrary, just because 
he resolved to prefer those things which are now to be done, for 
this very reason, in the words of Genesis, “they are very good”; in 
other words, the reason for their goodness depends on the fact that 
he exercised his will to make them so. (Descartes 1990, 293, 294)
It is difficult to assess the merits of these positions with regard to their 
claims about God’s options and (possible) limitations. This would 
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require a more intricate metaphysical theory than I would pretend to 
be able to proffer here; moreover, these thinkers do not, perhaps with 
the exception of Leibniz, really produce arguments why their position 
should be correct and, even if they had done so, in the absence of a 
covering, or—as is pertinent to this issue—God’s eye view, the matter 
can’t be resolved with a metaphysical analysis.
It is, however, possible to evaluate the positions from a meta-
ethical point of view.2 According to the first approach, good and bad 
exist as absolute standards.3 An account is needed why it is good to, 
e.g., give alms to the poor, or bad to lie. In the next section, a number 
of Biblical sections will be explored in order to find out whether an 
answer to this question can be found there. According to the second 
approach, in which God determines what “good” and “bad” actions 
are, an external criterion to obey Him is not available as it is supposed 
to be in the first approach, so the question why this should be done 
presents itself here, too.
2. The Two Options Explored
In this section, I will try to establish the tenability of the two positions 
outlined in the previous section. First, I will, in subsection 2.1, evalu-
ate the claims of those who argue that goodness as such exists from a 
religious (mainly Christian) point of view, and that it may provide a 
basis for acting. Second, the basis of God’s position as a fundamental 
lawgiver, to which the defenders of the second position adhere, will 
be investigated in subsection 2.2. Admittedly, the Bible—presumably 
having been written in an accessible style—doesn’t convey a philosophi-
cal message (Spinoza 1925, chap. 13 [167]), but that doesn’t mean 
that the texts should not be analyzed critically.
2.1. The Basic “Goodness” as a Motivational Element
There are a number of Biblical passages in which “good” deeds are 
prescribed and “bad” ones are forbidden. I will argue that the basis for 
complying with the norms according to which one is to behave and 
abstaining from those one is to avoid has a different basis than an ac-
knowledgement of their being “correct” (or “right”) respectively “wrong.”
The revelation of the Ten Commandments is an obvious place 
to start. These are presented as the fundamental directives God 
imposes upon man. According to the first option, there would be 
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something inherently “good” in obeying these commandments, or 
inherently ‘wrong” in disobeying them. It is clear that adhering to 
most, or possibly all of them would contribute to a stable society. The 
interdiction to murder (Deuteronomy 5:17), e.g., will, if observed, 
lead to a peaceful society in which people can prosper. It is, however, 
difficult to support the claim that the Commandments are supposed 
to represent moral values.
Some of the Commandments are not motivated but simply pos-
tulated; they can’t be helpful to this inquiry. In the case of blasphemy, 
conversely, a reason is given. This consists in the fact that “the Lord 
will not hold him guiltless who takes His name in vain” (Deuteronomy 
5:11). In this case, then, the (concealed) penalty which is to be bestowed 
upon the blasphemer is the basis for keeping to the norm. Similar 
accounts are given in Deuteronomy 28:15–68, where the curses for 
disobedience are described.
In the New Testament, the negative effects of failing to comply 
are, on the whole, less pungent than in the Hebrew Bible and are pre-
sented more subtly. Still, the basis analysis is the same. Matthew 7:1–2 
reads: “Judge not, that ye be not judged. For with what judgment ye 
judge, ye shall be judged: and with what measure ye mete, it shall be 
measured to you again.” The second verse gives the explanation—one 
shouldn’t judge because of the negative effects for oneself—but even the 
first verse points to this: there is a necessary connection between the 
imperative and the consequence by the use of the conjunction “that” 
(“hina”).4 It is hard, then, to evade the conclusion that self-interest is 
the motivation to comply. This is also the way the “golden rule”5 is 
to be interpreted (cf. Bultmann 1979, 107).
There are also passages in which the negative element is stressed—
e.g., Matthew 26:52 (“all they that take the sword shall perish with 
the sword”)—but the analysis is the same here: don’t partake in “bad” 
or “wrong” actions because they will reflect on you (cf., e.g., Sura 
16:104–111).
The positive elements, i.e., those which point to rewards, evince 
the same analysis as the penal ones outlined above. To commence 
again with the Ten Commandments, the Fifth is “Honor thy father 
and thy mother, as the Lord thy God hath commanded thee; that thy 
days may be prolonged, and that it may go well with thee, in the land 
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which the Lord thy God giveth thee.” (Deuteronomy 5:16). In this 
case, the reason for keeping to the Commandment appears to be that 
a reward will follow. No intrinsic reason is given (cf., e.g., Sura 43:74, 
Sura 44:51–57)6 (which may be impossible at any rate, but that will 
be dealt with further on).
The general motivation is presented in Deuteronomy 29:9: “Keep 
. . . the words of this covenant, and do them, that ye may prosper in 
all that ye do” (cf., e.g., Deuteronomy 8:1). The reward for believing 
and acting as God commands lies in being saved (e.g., Matthew 6:1–6, 
7:21, 21:21–22; Romans 10:9) (cf. Sura 19:60–61). It is stated in 
Luke 6:35: “[L]ove ye your enemies, and do good, and lend, hoping 
for nothing again.” This seems not to appeal to any positive results 
for the actor. Still, the passage continues, “and your reward shall be 
great, and ye shall be the children of the Highest: for he is kind unto 
the unthankful and to the evil.” As the conjunction connecting the 
sections is a neutral one in this case (“kai” [“and”]), not introducing 
a final clause (as in the case of Matthew 7:1 mentioned above), one 
might argue that there is no necessary link with the agreeable conse-
quences. It would be difficult, however, to find another reason than 
this for someone to be so kind to his enemies as is prescribed. One 
would have to appeal to some sort of “goodness” or altruism, both 
of which are problematic, as will be pointed out in sections 3 and 4, 
respectively. First, the second possibility, “good” actions being such 
as a result of God’s decree, needs to be examined.
2.2. God as the Basic Legislator
The interpretation of the “good” and “bad” actions of the previous 
subsection amounts to the conclusion that the basis for acting or 
refraining lies in the penalty or reward which may result from it. The 
question is whether the second position, according to which God 
decides what it means for something to be “good” or “bad,” may 
provide another analysis.
A basic given is God’s power to both reward and punish (Deu-
teronomy 11:26–28) (cf., e.g., Sura 3:189, Sura 5:40). God’s power 
is continuously implicit in this interpretation; if the Ten Command-
ments do not attest to values which are good as such (as in the first 
interpretation), their enforcement is an all the more pressing issue. 
It is, then, incumbent upon man to fear God (Deuteronomy 6:2, 
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10:12–13; Matthew 10:28). One may argue that Abraham, when 
commanded by God to sacrifice Isaac (Genesis 22:2–10), intended to 
do so on the following basis: “Why . . . does Abraham do it? For God’s 
sake and—the two are wholly identical—for his own sake. He does it 
for God’s sake because God demands this proof of his faith; he does it 
for his own sake so that he can prove it.” (Kierkegaard 1983, 59, 60). 
Nevertheless, it is the fear of God that is presented by God Himself 
as the crucial reason: “And he said, Lay not thine hand upon the lad, 
neither do thou any thing unto him: for now I know that thou fearest 
God, seeing thou hast not withheld thy son, thine only son from me.” 
(Genesis 22:12). Finally, even the man at the cross beside Christ who 
showed remorse7 refers to the fear of God (Luke 23:40–42).
The problem is evident: if the reason one is to obey God lies in 
His position as a legislator (and final judge), there doesn’t seem to be 
a moral criterion. It is simply God’s power, and not His or another 
goodness, which is decisive.8 His authority would be analogous to 
that of the human legislator. This is an important given which is to 
be explored in section 3.
3. The Reasons to Comply with Divine Directives
3.1. Selfishness as the Pivotal Element
Now that the two positions have been explored, it is time to evaluate 
them, as will be done in this subsection and the next. The problem 
with the first position appears to be that no explanation is given why 
something is good. The Bible mentions the knowledge of good and evil 
(Genesis 2:17, 3:5), but this isn’t explicated. One might try to appeal 
to a common sense-approach, which may have been discounted in the 
places referred to in subsection 2.1. The fact that the consequences for 
the actor are mentioned should then be ignored, but it is worthwhile 
to inquire whether this may be a viable option.
It seems obvious that, e.g., it is a good thing to give to the poor 
and a bad thing to commit murder. If the reasons why one acts or 
abstains are investigated, however, the issue may turn out to be more 
intricate than it seems to be at first. In this case, the self-interest I 
made explicit in the previous section (where, e.g., the rewards given 
by God are decisive) is not at stake, as I already indicated not to focus 
on it for now.
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A first option is that one simply gives to the poor because one 
may at some point in the future be poor oneself; for that reason, one 
wants others to remember one’s deed so that they (themselves having 
acquired enough means in the meantime) will reciprocate, perhaps 
for the same reason one oneself gave in the first place. The act then 
becomes one of insurance, really; one isn’t sure whether one will fall 
on bad times, but should such a situation arise, it is nice to know there 
is a chance one won’t be deprived of the basic9 needs. The situation 
is, of course, optimal if one doesn’t have to rely on the other party’s 
willingness to return the favor or contributing for another reason and 
one lives in a society with a relatively stable system of distribution.
Such a system of distribution has been implemented and expanded 
in the developed countries.10 In this case, one merely contributes (e.g., 
through taxes) because of the safety-net which is provided for oneself. 
(There are those who are rich enough not to have to worry and whose 
position might only be in danger in case of an emergency, but they 
don’t have the option not to contribute. They simply pay because their 
voice isn’t strong enough or, put differently, their view isn’t represented 
to a great enough extent in the political process.)
A second option consists in giving to someone one cares about, 
like a friend.11 Is self-interest at stake here? The difficulty lies in the 
qualification of “self.” I won’t expound a discourse here that would 
diverge too much from the current theme, but the question whether 
one considers a friend (or, e.g., one’s wife, or a family member) as 
exhibiting a special position is a relevant one. The sort of relation 
there is to another person seems, in many cases, to matter to one’s 
attitude towards him or her. One may argue, then, that in this case 
self-interest is displayed, albeit not self-interest in the sense that only 
the actor is at stake (abandoning his friend, wife or family member 
if that should prove to be most advantageous) but in the sense that 
one is connected to another person and on that basis wants him or 
her to prosper.
This does, of course, call for a division within the notion of “self-
interest”; this variant may be dubbed “indirect self-interest” rather than 
direct self-interest (by “direct self-interest” I understand the self-interest 
which is at stake when one intends to serve one’s own needs).12 After 
all, the action isn’t directed at a random person but just at someone 
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whose interest one wants to promote. In other words, it is in one’s 
(indirect) self-interest that the (direct) self-interest of the other party 
is served. This even extends to dying for one’s friends (John 15:13), 
which means that one considers one’s indirect self-interest more im-
portant than one’s direct self-interest. Of course, it is conceivable that 
someone (aspires to) include everyone in his or her circle of intimates, 
but this is immaterial to the analysis: it merely means that many beings 
are involved; the motivation is no different than in cases in which a 
small number of beings are at stake.
A third option is to focus on the situation rather than on the quality 
of the relation. One may experience sympathy when one observes how 
someone one doesn’t even know suffers as a result of his or her lack 
of means. Does this evince altruism? The etymology of “sympathy” is 
helpful here. The word “sympathy” is a compound of “sun” (“together”) 
and “pathos” (“feeling” or “suffering”).13 If one takes this seriously, it is 
the suffering of oneself in observing the struggles of someone else that 
is at stake; the person in distress and the observer both suffer (albeit 
in different respects). This means that it is really one’s own suffering 
one wants to alleviate. No “good” deeds are involved.14
3.2. A Satanic Stance
If God is the propagator of “good” and “bad” and if His power is 
the decisive element (cf. subsection 2.2), a number of confronting 
questions are raised. Hobbes’s stance is helpful in this regard. In his 
view, the reason to abstain from malicious acts is that these may have 
negative effects for oneself: “The institution of eternal punishment 
was before sin, and had regard to this only, that men might dread to 
commit sin for the time to come” (Hobbes 1983, chap. 4, §9 [80]). 
“Good” and “bad” are interpreted as subjective (Hobbes 1983, chap. 
3, §31 [74]; cf. Hobbes 1983, chap. 12, §1 [146])15 until the legislator 
creates an—artificial—standard (Hobbes 1983, chap. 12, §1 [146]; 
Hobbes 2007, chap. 29 [223]; cf. Hobbes 2007, chap. 46 [461]).
As Hobbes maintains that man only acts in his own interest,16 it 
is not surprising that it is God’s power which is decisive:
The right of nature, whereby God reigneth over men, and punisheth 
those that break his Lawes, is to be derived not from his Creating 
them as if he required obedience, as of Gratitude for his benefits; 
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but from his Irresistible Power. (Hobbes 2007, chap. 31 [246] (cf. 
Hobbes 1983, chap. 15, §5 [185])
Significantly, “religion” is defined by Hobbes as “Feare of power invis-
ible, feigned by the mind, or imagined from tales publiquely allowed” 
(Hobbes 2007, chap. 6 [42]).
In subsections 2.1 and 3.1, the problems with the criterion which 
focuses on the content of the norm to which one is to adhere were 
brought to light. If the criterion (God’s position as a legislator) also 
fails to display a moral element, why would it be moral to obey God? 
In fact, if the power criterion is determinative, one might argue that 
it would be incumbent upon man, acting in his self-interest, to obey 
Satan, if he should prove to be more powerful than God. Just to be 
clear, this is not what I myself propose. After all, if the Christian 
doctrine is correct, God is more powerful than Satan (cf., e.g., Job 
1:12, Revelation 12:8–9); and if it is not, I am not inclined to such 
a course of action on the basis of any conviction. In fact, with regard 
to the question whether God (or Satan, for that matter) exists, I must 
suspend my judgment as I have no means to establish His existence 
or non-existence. It may be objected that such a conviction is present 
in some who on that basis still find a reason to act in accordance with 
God’s dictates; they are presumed to simply grasp that it is good (or 
bad) to do something and to find a directive on that basis. I will try 
to counter such an objection in section 4.
4. Meta-Ethical Considerations
In order to attempt to unnerve the results reached in the foregoing, 
one might try to appeal to “good” and “bad” (or “evil”). Don’t the 
issues mentioned attest to these notions? Isn’t it, e.g., simply good to 
give to the poor? From an ethical point of view, this may indeed be 
argued. At that level, the pivotal question is: “what is good?”; one seeks 
to do good things. The meta-ethical question, and that is the one at 
stake here, is: “what is ‘good’?” The meaning (if any) of the ethical 
notions is concerned.
One may adduce that it is not because of the agreeable results 
that one acts but, conversely, that rewards are sought because they 
are considered good (Boethius 2000, 109). In a similar vein, it may 
be stated that
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it is necessary for evil men to be unhappier when they have ac-
complished what they longed for than if they might be unable to 
implement the things they long for. ([I]nfeliciores esse necesse est 
malos cum cupita perfecerint, quam si ea quae cupiunt implere non 
possint.) (Boethius 2000, 113)
Augustine indicates that happiness is only attainable for those who 
do not seek after evil (Augustine 1955, 286, 288).
The problem in these accounts is that they presuppose the existence 
of good and evil; it isn’t clarified how this may be maintained and what 
it means. If these notions can’t be maintained for that reason, does 
that also mean that the difference between doing something out of 
selfish motives and for a moral reason is cancelled, reducing the latter 
to the former? Abelard makes the following distinctions:
[R]epentance at one time happens out of love for God and is fruit-
ful, at another because of some penalty with which we do not want 
to be burdened. (Abelard 1971, 76/77)
Daily . . . we see many about to depart from this life repenting of 
their shameful accomplishments and groaning with great compunc-
tion, not so much out of love of God whom they have offended 
or out of hatred of the sin which they have committed as out of 
fear of the punishment into which they are afraid of being hurled. 
(Abelard 1971, 78/79)
Assuming one acts out of love of God, if one does, it is not the direct 
self-interest which is concerned (as would be the case if one were to 
act to avoid punishment), but the indirect self-interest (cf. subsection 
3.1). One simply prefers acting out of love of God to sinning. Of 
course, it may be objected that one has faith without being able to 
know (through reason) whether one will be rewarded or punished. 
Doesn’t this evince the righteousness of the believer? First, if this is his 
position, his faith is blind; he has no ground to believe in anything 
rather than in anything else and any conviction (if one may call it that) 
he has is random. The religion to which he adheres is interchangeable 
for another, precisely because of the fact that he has no reason to cling 
to one rather than to another.17 Second, this course of action doesn’t 
appear to differ from insuring one’s possessions (not knowing whether 
something may happen to them), where paying the premium is similar 
to performing the “good” deeds. By contrast, if one is able to know 
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whether a reward or punishment will ensue, the major premise of the 
objection is cancelled.
The objection that one acts from an insight into what is “good” 
and “bad” can still be proposed. One acts in accordance with the Ten 
Commandments, e.g., because one acknowledges their value. I can’t 
prove that those who have an intuition of this sort are wrong. It is, 
however, doubtful whether their position is tenable. Is there such a 
thing as an intrinsic good quality? The Bible isn’t helpful here. In the 
statement that “The Lord is good, a strong hold in the day of trouble” 
(Nahum 1:7), is “a strong hold in the day of trouble” the reason why 
He is good? If so, the positive effects of His actions are simply posited 
and “good” should be understood as “agreeable” or “useful.” If not, 
no reason for His goodness is given.
Leaving the Bible aside, it is difficult in general, having analyzed 
the elements involved in actions, to find “goodness,” especially if 
one considers accounts such as Mackie’s argument from queerness, 
indicating that it is hard to see how moral qualities would fit with 
the things with which one is acquainted (Mackie 1978, 38–42). It is, 
then, up to those who appeal to intuitions, to inquire whether these 
really pertain to “good” and “bad” elements or whether they may be 
reduced to other elements than these.
Conclusion
In this article, I have attempted to ascertain whether moral elements 
may be present in religion, having focused on the Christian faith. A 
number of results were reached which may be perceived by some as 
radical. It was my intention to inquire as critically as possible, not 
eschewing any conclusion a priori. Still, the outcome doesn’t neces-
sarily lead to far-reaching practical changes. In particular, no reasons 
not to adhere to Christianity (or any other religion) were brought to 
the fore. By contrast, I have concentrated on the specific motivation 
to do so. This culminated in two perspectives.
If one is to act on account of an acknowledgment of the (inherent) 
goodness or wickedness of some things, it is important to find out 
whether such qualities may be said to exist at all. The reason frequently 
given in the Bible (a reward or punishment which is to follow) merely 
points to a selfish perspective and discounts an alternative explanation.
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The same analysis can be applied to the situation in which God’s 
power is the central issue. Selfishness may be advanced in general as 
the basic drive to act. A meta-ethical inquiry also poses some difficult 
questions (not only to religions, but to a number of philosophies as 
well) which can’t be ignored. This is not necessarily detrimental to the 
position of religions; it does mean that some of the doctrines pertaining 
to reasons for adhering to them may be up for critical revision. Still, it 
will mean that the followers of religions will be able to maintain them 
in a world in which their tenets are ever more critically questioned.
Notes
1. In each instance where I have translated a section myself, I have included the 
original texts. The spelling of the original texts in English and French has been 
preserved, even if this conflicts with the present spelling.
2. Meta-ethics deals with the basic notions in ethics, e.g., what “good” and “bad” 
mean (if anything). The next sections will present a more elaborate account than 
the one provided here.
3. Of course, it is argued that evil things are nothing, as they don’t proceed from God 
(Damiani 1972, 609 B [436], 610 C, D [442]), and that evil is to be considered 
an absence of goodness (e.g., Anselm 1940, chap. 5 [146]); cf. Augustine 1949, 
XVII, 17 [454]).
4. This Gospel is possibly a translation of an Aramaic or Hebrew text that is lost.
5. Matthew 7:12: “[A]ll things whatsoever ye would that men should do to you, do 
ye even so to them: for this is the law and the prophets.”
6. Hinduism, in which reincarnation into a new body by the soul after one has died 
is a central tenet, and the concept of God (if one may qualify it as such) differs 
greatly from that of Judaism, Christianity, and Islam, proffers a different explanation 
from a metaphysical point of view, but it may be argued that the way one’s deeds 
in life (Karma) are the basis for one’s misery or fortune (or, rather, in Hinduism, 
the degree of misery), and one’s attempt to reach “Moksha” (the release from life) 
can be qualified in the same way from a meta-ethical point of view.
7. Matthew 27:38–44 and Mark 15:27–32 report that neither of the two men who 
were crucified together with Christ repented.
8. Cf. Mackie’s observation that resorting to the position that God’s commands 
supply the prescriptive element in morality undermines morality itself (Mackie 
1982, 256).
9. One may debate which needs are “basic”; I won’t deal with that in this article, as 
it is not a crucial issue here.
10. There are varying degrees to which the basic needs can be supplied, the Scandina-
vian countries at present realizing a more elaborate program than, e.g., the United 
States, which is a result of (inter alia) political choices, but the basic structure is 
similar.
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11. There is no a priori limit here—animals could also be recipients—but for the 
sake of convenience I will limit the account to human beings.
12. The demarcation between direct and indirect self-interest may be difficult or even 
impossible to find, but that is not a problem for the analysis which is proposed 
here.
13. The phoneme /n/ has changed to /m/ through the phonological process of regres-
sive assimilation.
14. Incidentally, the motivation to sympathize with other beings in Hinduism (with 
both human beings and animals) is based on the fact that one thinks “Âtman” 
(one’s soul) is actually identical to “Brahman” (the whole of things) so that the 
explanation can be used here, albeit in a somewhat intricate way, too.
15. Significantly, Hobbes also states: “[T]here is no such Finis ultimus, (utmost ayme,) 
nor Summum Bonum, (greatest Good,) as is spoken of in the Books of the old 
Morall Philosophers” (Hobbes 2007, chap. 11 [70]).
16. “[O]f the voluntary acts of every man, the object is some Good to himselfe” (Hobbes 
2007, chap. 14 [93]). I do not completely agree with Hobbes at this point as he 
seems to leave no room for the indirect self-interest I discerned (in my terminol-
ogy, he reduces all motivation to direct self-interest), but that doesn’t matter for 
the analysis of the current issue.
17. In fact, this is my position. This is the reason why I suspend judgment with 
regard to the issue of which religion (if any) is the right one, and consider myself 
an agnostic.
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